









The Centre for Health Economics Research and Evaluation (CHERE) was 
established in 1991.  CHERE is a centre of excellence in health economics and 
health services research. It is a joint Centre of the Faculties of Business 
and Nursing, Midwifery and Health at the University of Technology, Sydney, in 
collaboration with Central Sydney Area Health Service. It was established as a 
UTS Centre in February, 2002. The Centre aims to contribute to the development 
and application of health economics and health services research through 
research, teaching and policy support. CHERE’s research program encompasses 
both the theory and application of health economics. The main theoretical 
research theme pursues valuing benefits, including understanding what 
individuals value from health and health care, how such values should be 
measured, and exploring the social values attached to these benefits. The 
applied research  focuses on economic and the appraisal of new programs or new 
ways of delivering and/or funding services. CHERE’s teaching includes 
introducing clinicians, health services managers, public health professionals 
and others to health economic principles. Training programs aim to develop 
practical skills in health economics and health services research. Policy 
support is provided at all levels of the health care system by undertaking 
commissioned projects, through the provision of formal and informal advice as 
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Recent OECD country comparative evidence suggests that Australia’s mixed public-
private health system does a good job in ensuring high and fairly equal access to doctor, 
hospital and dental care services. This paper provides some further analysis of the same 
data from the Australian National Health Survey for 2001 to see to what extent the 
general finding of horizontal equity remains when the full potential of the data is realized. 
We extend the common core cross-country comparative analysis by expanding the set of 
indicators used in the procedure of standardizing for health care need differences, by 
providing a separate analysis for the use for general practitioner and specialist care and 
by differentiating between admissions as public and private patients.  
 
Overall, our analysis confirms that in 2001 Medicare largely did seem to be attaining its 
goal of an equitable distribution of health care access: Australians in need of care did get 
to see a doctor and to be admitted to a hospital. However, they were not equally likely to 
see the same doctor and to end up in the same hospital bed. As in other OECD countries, 
higher income Australians are more likely to consult a specialist, all else equal, while 
lower income patients were more likely to consult a general practitioner. The unequal 
distribution of private health insurance contributes to the phenomenon that the better-off 
and the less well-off do not receive the same mix of services. There is a risk that, as in 
some other OECD countries, the Medicare objective of equal access for equal need may 
be further compromised by the future expansion of the private sector in secondary care 
services. To the extent that such inequalities in use may translate in inequalities in health 
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1. Introduction  
 
Australia provides universal coverage through a publicly financed health scheme, known 
generally as Medicare. Free public hospital care and free or subsidized medical care 
should ensure that equitable access to health care, at least in terms of financial barriers, is 
achieved. Nonetheless, out-of-pocket spending on health care in Australia is higher than 
many similar OECD countries and has been growing rapidly (Australian Institute of 
Health and Welfare, 2005). Since 1996, government policy has encouraged the growth of 
the private sector with subsidies and tax incentives for private health insurance. There 
have been recent concerns over increasing patient payments, particularly for primary 
medical care, which have resulted in new strategies aimed at limiting exposure to out-of-
pocket costs. 
 
A recent five-country comparative study based on the 2001 Commonwealth Fund 
International Health Policy Survey compared inequities in access to medical care in 
Australia to those observed in Canada, New Zealand, United Kingdom, and United 
States. On the basis of a multivariate analysis of a cross-sectional 2001 random telephone 
survey of 1400 adults in each of these countries, they conclude that here were few 
significant access differences by income in Australia; yet, compared to UK, Australians 
were more likely to report out of pocket costs, and those with above-average income were 
more likely to have private supplemental insurance which protected them from cost-
related access problems. However, this study uses respondents’ own ratings about 
whether they are in high or low income and whether or not they experienced any access 
problems.  
 
In the health economics literature, a fairly standard approach to the testing and 
measurement of income-related inequity in actual health care utilisation using health 
interview surveys has been developed (Wagstaff and van Doorslaer, 2000) and applied in 
a number of cross-country comparisons of income-related inequity (Van Doorslaer et al, 
1992, 1993, 2000). An early study using similar methods was done for Australia (Lairson 
et al, 1995) using the 1989-90 National Health Survey. They find mixed results but this is 
largely due to their separate use of various morbidity variables as health care need 
indicators.  Recently, Australia was included for the first time in a similar comparison 
involving 21 OECD countries and using a more appropriate and uniform methodology 
(Van Doorslaer et al, 2004, 2006). The Australian results show a slight pro-poor 
inequality in both the probability of hospital visit and no inequality in the probability of 
doctor visits over the last twelve months. While this suggests that the Australian system 
performs well against the equitable access criterion, this conclusion has to be treated 
cautiously.  Data availability (from the Australian 2001 National Health Survey) allowed 
only a limited number of comparisons with other OCED countries. For example, the 2001 
NHS asked for recall of whether there had been a GP or specialist doctor visit in the last 
two weeks, how many such visits and the time since the last consultation with either type 
of doctor. For hospital admissions data was collected on number of admissions in the last 
twelve months and the number of nights and patient type at the most recent admission. A 
finding for other OECD countries was that while the majority had either pro-poor or non-
significant levels of inequality in the overall number of doctor visits in the last twelve 
months, the distribution of general practitioner visit was generally pro-poor while the  
distribution of specialist visits was generally pro-rich. The 2001 NHS did allow this 
comparison over the twelve month recall frame.  
 
The aim of this paper is to explore further the issue of income-related use of health care 
in Australia. In particular, we examine inequality in hospital use split by patient status, 
public or private, and the distribution of GP and specialist use over the 2 week timeframe. 
We also undertake a decomposition of the inequality measure for GP and specialist visits 
to shed light on how different factors contribute to the inequalities in access to care. The 
horizontal version of the equity principle is interpreted to require that people in equal 
need of care are treated equally, irrespective of characteristics such as income, place of 
residence, race, etc. It is this principle of horizontal equity that the present study uses as 
the yardstick for its assessment of the Australian situation.  
 
2. The Australian health care system and equity  
 
Medicare covers basic hospital, medical services and pharmaceuticals. Private health 
insurance is limited to covering private hospital treatment (in a public or private hospital) 
and some ancillary services, including dentistry. Concession card holders, largely those in 
receipt of the aged pension or other social security payments, are entitled to a lower co-
payment under the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme. While there has been an expectation 
that concession card holders would be bulk billed, there has been no explicit incentive to 
do so in the period under consideration. 
 
All Australians are entitled to be treated free of charge as public patients in public 
hospitals.  Private treatment is subsidized through the reimbursement of some in-hospital 
medical costs. Since 1996 there has been increasing government emphasis on private 
financing of health care, with a series of incentives designed to increase private cover. 
These include the 30% subsidy on private insurance premiums introduced in 1999 and 
lifetime community rating, introduced in 2000, which mandated an age-related premium 
loading for new entrants aged over 30 years at entry to private health insurance (Hall and 
Savage 2005). Overall private health insurance coverage rose from 31% to 45%.   The 
extent to which private patients in both public and private hospitals face out-of-pocket 
costs depends on their insurance policy and agreements between insurers and providers. 
Private insurance offers the choice of doctor (public patients are treated by doctors paid 
by the hospital); and lower waiting times particularly for elective surgery. 
 
Out of hospital medical services are for the most part provided by private medical 
practitioners on a fee for service basis. The patient is reimbursed by Medicare according 
to a fee schedule set by government (at 85% of schedule fees during this period). 
However, if the provider bills government directly (known in Australia as bulk billing), 
the Medicare reimbursement must be accepted as full payment, and the patient faces no 
out of pocket cost. Thus the basic structure for hospital admissions and medical services 
has been established so that most Australians can use essential health care without 
financial barriers.  
 
Although the government, in effect, sets a floor price for medical services, medical 
practitioners are free to set their own fees. Any fee above the bulk billing reimbursement 
  
rate must be met by the patient as an out-of-pocket payment and cannot be covered by 
private health insurance. Bulk billing rates overall have increased over time, from under 
50% of all items in 1984/5 to around 70% in 2001; and are higher in general practice, 
around 75% in 2001 : (DoHA statistics). Bulk billing varies by provider specialty, 
whether a city or rural location, and socio-economic characteristics of the area of 
residence. As a result, whether or not a patient faces an out-of-pocket cost for a medical 
service depends on provider behaviour.  
 
 
3. Methods and data  
 
The degree of inequality in use of health care can be measured using the concept of a 
concentration curve as shown in Figure 11,2. It plots the cumulative distribution of use as 
a function of the cumulative distribution of the population ranked by income. A 
distribution is equal if the cumulative distribution coincides with the diagonal. If the 
curve lies above (below) the diagonal this indicates that use is more concentrated among 
the poor (rich). A concentration index (CI) measures the degree of inequality in use. 
When it is positive, it indicates pro-rich inequality, and when it is negative, it indicates 
pro-poor inequality.  
 
We would expect overall health care use to be pro-poor because lower income groups 
generally have poorer health status and therefore higher need. A more appropriate 
measure of inequality would adjust use for differences in need. In this paper we estimate 
the degree of inequality in need-standardized use. 
 
 
Figure 1:  A (stylized) concentration curve of medical care use 
 
The method we use to describe and measure the degree of horizontal inequity in health 
care delivery is conceptually identical to the one used in Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer 
(2000a), Van Doorslaer et al. (2000) , Van Doorslaer, Koolman and Puffer (2002) and 
Van Doorslaer, Masseria et al (2004). This compares the observed distribution of medical 
care by income with the distribution of need. In order to statistically adjust needs for 
groups or individuals, the average relationship between need and use estimated for the 
population as a whole is used as the “norm” of what treatment is needed. We investigate 
the extent to which there are any systematic deviations from this norm by income level. 
The approach is to model health care use employing OLS regression techniques. 
Health care utilisation data such as physician visits are known to have skewed 
distributions with typically a large majority of survey respondents reporting zero or very 
few visits and only a very small proportion reporting frequent use. Because these features 
cause violations of the standard OLS model, various specifications of non-linear, two-part 
models have been proposed in the literature, distinguishing between the probability of 
positive usage and the amount of usage conditional on use in the reference period (see 
Jones, 2000, for a review). While these models have certain advantages over OLS 
specifications, their intrinsic non-linearity makes the (linear) decomposition method 
described above impossible. In order to restore the mechanics of the decomposition, one 
has to revert to a re-linearization of the models using approximations (see Van Doorslaer, 
  
Koolman and Jones, 2003, for an example). However, Van Doorslaer et al. (2000) and 
Van Doorslaer, Masseria et al (2004) have shown that the measurement of horizontal 
inequality is not sensitive to the specification. We are confident that our results are not 
conditional on the choice of the linear standardization model.  
3. 1 Measurement of inequity 
This study describes distributions of actual and need-adjusted use of health care by 
income quintile, each representing 20% of the total population ranked by household 
equivalent income from poorest to richest. ”Need-expected” health care use is computed 
by regressing medical care use,  , (e.g. doctor visits or hospital nights) on a set of 
explanatory variables.  
i y
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We distinguish between three types of explanatory variables: the (logarithm of) the 
household income of individual i (l ), a set of k need indicator variables ( n i inc k x ) 
including demographic and morbidity variables, and p non-need variables ( ).  p z α ,  β , 
γ k  and δ p are parameters and εi  is an error term.  
Equation 1 is used to generate need-predicted values of use, , i.e. the expected use of 
medical care of individual i on the basis of his/her need characteristics. It indicates the 
amount of medical care s/he would received if s/he had been treated as others with the 
same need characteristics (e.g. age), on average. Combining estimates of the coefficients 
in Equation (1) with actual values of the 
X
i y ˆ
k x  variables and sample mean values of the 
 and   variables, we can obtain the need-predicted, or “x-expected” values of 
utilisation, as: 
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Estimates of the (indirectly) need-standardized utilisation, ˆ
IS
i y , are then obtained as the 
difference between actual and x-expected utilisation, plus the sample mean ()
m y  
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The quintile means of these indirectly standardized values provide our need-standardized 
distributions of medical care. They are interpreted as the expected distributions if need 
were equally distributed across quintiles.  
Quintile distributions are difficult to compare across types of care. It is therefore useful to 
summarize the degree of inequality observed using a concentration index which can be 
computed using a simple covariance formula, as shown below for weighted data:  
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where 
m y  is the weighted sample mean of y, covw denotes the weighted covariance and Ri 










where wi denotes the sampling weight of the ith individual and the sum of wi equals the 
sample size (n).  
Testing for differences between concentration indices requires confidence intervals. 
Robust estimates for C and its standard error can be obtained by running the following 
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where
2 σ R is the variance of Ri and  1 ˆ β  is equal to C, and the estimated standard error of 1 ˆ β  
provides the estimated standard error of C.  
The concentration index of the actual medical care use measures the degree of inequality 
and the concentration index of the need-standardized use (which is our horizontal 
inequity index HI) measures the degree of needs-adjusted inequality. It is worth 
emphasizing that coinciding concentration curves for need and actual use provide a 
sufficient but not a necessary condition for horizontal equity. Even with crossing curves, 
one could have zero inequity if, for example, inequity favoring the poor in one part of the 
distribution exactly offsets inequity favoring the rich in another.  
3. 2 Use of decomposition to explain inequality 
It is possible to estimate the “contributions” of the various determinants and their relative 
importance. Using the regression coefficients  k γ , (partial) elasticities of medical care use 
with respect to each determinant k can then be defined as: 
[7]  /
mm
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where y
m is the (population weighted mean) of y and 
m
k x is the (population weighted) 
mean of xk. These elasticities denote the percentage change in y result from a percentage 
change in xk.  
It has been shown (Wagstaff, Van Doorslaer and Watanabe, 2003) that the total 
concentration index can then be written as: 
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where the first term denotes the partial contribution of income inequality, the second the 
(partial) contribution of the need variables, and the third the (partial) contribution of the 
other variables. The last term is the generalized concentration index of the error term ε. In 
other words, estimated inequality in predicted medical care use is a weighted sum of the 
inequality in each of its determinants, with the weights equal to the medical care use 
  
elasticities. The decomposition also makes clear how each determinant k’s separate 
contribution to total income-related inequality in health care demand can be decomposed 
into two meaningful parts: i) its impact on use, as measured by the use elasticity (ηk), and 
ii) its degree of unequal distribution across income, as measured by the (income) 
concentration index (Ck). This decomposition method allows us to separate the 
contributions of the various determinants, and also to identify the importance of each of 
these two components within each factor’s total contribution.  
3.3  Data and variables used 
We use data from the 2001 Australian National Health Survey which is conducted using a 
representative sample of the non-institutionalized residential population. In this study we 
focus on the adult sample (>18). Measurement of health care utilisation is based on a 
combination of various survey questions. The probability of reporting at least one visit to 
any doctor, (either a general practitioner or a medical specialist) in the last 12 months was 
derived from answers to the question “When was the last time you visited a doctor?”. The 
actual number of visits to a general practitioner or a medical specialist was recorded only 
for the 2 weeks preceding the interview.  We also use the probability of having been 
admitted to a hospital in the last 12 months, and we separately investigate admissions as a 
public or as a private patient.  
The measurement of health as a proxy for care need was based on four types of questions. 
First, respondents’ rating of their general health status based on five categories 
(‘excellent’, ‘very good’, ‘good’, ‘fair’, and ‘poor’). Second, data indicating whether a 
respondent’s health status got somewhat worse, or much worse, over the last year was 
used to create a dummy variable for deterioration in health. Third, for the analysis of 
hospital use, dummy variables were included for health care conditions that were 
constructed from detailed data on long term conditions. Finally, nine age and gender 
dummies were included to reflect the fact that the meaning of the above health indicators 
tends to differ by age and sex.  
This is a more extensive set of explanatory variables than the one used in Van Doorslaer, 
Masseria et al (2004). It is well known that the inclusion of additional health information 
in the need standardization procedure tends to result in less pro-poor results (see Van 
Doorslaer, Wagstaff and Rutten, 1993). This appears to be because the poor suffer from 
health problems more frequently and their health problems tend to be more severe. Less 
extensive use of health information in the need standardization process, because of the 
selection of a common core set of indicators for cross-country comparisons, may lead to 
an overestimation of pro-poor patterns. We therefore expect less pro-poor findings in this 
study.  
Household income per equivalent adult was only available for income decile groups. Our 
income measure was defined as the logarithm of the mean household weekly equivalent 
income for the decile in which the individual’s household was located (ranging from 
$110 for the bottom decile to $1420 for the top decile).   
Other explanatory variables used in the analysis included education and employment 
status, as these  factors  may affect an individual’s general propensity to consume health 
care, but  cannot often directly be influenced by health policy makers. A dummy variable 
  
for whether the respondent usually speaks English at home was included as an indicator 
of  non-financial access to health care, and dummies for location in major city or inner 
region to capture differences in geographical access to doctor and hospital services.  
Health insurance coverage was measured by two variables: whether the person has 
private health insurance coverage, and whether the person has a health care concession 
card.  
 
4. Results  
 
We present quintile distributions and concentration indices for all types of care and for 
both unadjusted (actual) distributions and for need-adjusted (standardized) probabilities 
of use. Next, we investigate the contributions of various determinants of health care use 
using the decomposition results. 
 
4.1 Quintile distributions and indices  
 
The level of health care use in Australia is quite high compared to most other OECD 
countries; 87% of the population has seen a doctor in the last year (28% even in the last 
two weeks) and over 14% have been admitted to a hospital within the previous year.  But 
such comparisons of admission rates may be contaminated by uncertainties regarding the 
appropriate labeling of day admissions as proper admissions or outpatient visits (Van 
Doorslaer, Masseria et al, 2004).  
 
Table 1 presents probabilities and concentration indices for all subcategories of doctor 
and hospital use. For all types of use except private hospital admissions, lower income 
groups are more intensive users, as can be seen from the negative gradients by quintile 
and the (significantly) negative concentration indices of actual use. This is not an 
unfamiliar pattern in countries with universal coverage systems and reflects the fact that 
the need for care tends to be inversely related to income (cf. Van Doorslaer et al, 2004). 
But the degree clearly varies by type of visit and by type of admission, as is illustrated 
graphically in Figures 2 and 3.  Figure 2 shows that the quintile distributions of GP visits 
are more concentrated among the lower income groups than the visits to medical 
specialists. And similarly, figure 3 demonstrates that the distributions of hospital 
admissions as public or private patient differ dramatically by income: the probability of 
being admitted as a public patient is three times higher than that of being admitted as a 
private patient in the bottom quintile. The reverse s true at the high end: in the top income 
quintile the private admission probability is twice the public admission probability.  
 
The results for needs-standardized use are also shown in Table 1. The pattern is more 
mixed.  The annual probability of seeing a doctor is fairly equally distributed. It is highest 
in the top quintile but the differences are very small and the non-significant concentration 
index suggests an equitable distribution. All other indices are significantly different from 
zero, suggesting either inequity favoring the poor (if negative) or inequity favouring the 
rich (if positive). GP visit probability in the last two weeks is pro-poor while specialist 
visit probability is pro-rich. The combined doctor visit probability in the last two weeks is 
  




Table 1: Fractions of users, by quintile, by type of care, (NHS 2001) 
 
 
Figure 2: GP and specialist visit probabilities in the last two weeks by doctor type 
  by quintile of equivalent income (NHS 2001) 
 
 
  Figure 3: Public and private admission probabilities in the last 12 months by  
  quintile of equivalent income (NHS 2001) 
 
 
A similar pattern is observed when we examine hospital admission probabilities. The 
overall picture is one of a very pro-poor distribution, which remains slightly pro-poor 
even after standardization for need, but this obscures two very different patterns 
underlying admission as either a public or as a private patient. It is, of course, not 
possible to estimate the need for a public or a private admission separately from these 
data, only the general need for a hospital admission, which is why no need standardized 
distributions are presented separately for public and private patient admissions.   
 
4.2 Decomposition of specialist visits and public/private admissions 
 
A factor contributes to inequality in use if it is both distributed unequally by income and 
has an effect on the probability of using health care. The mechanics of the decomposition 
method are illustrated in Table 2 for the probability of a specialist visit. The table 
presents the mean, concentration index and regression coefficient for each explanatory 
variable in the model. These are translated into an inequality contribution using equation 
(7) in section 3.2. The CI for actual specialist visits (-0.050) corresponds to that presented 
in Table 1. The HI is derived as the CI minus the sum of the contributions of all the need 
indicators. It can be seen that virtually all the contributions of need proxies (especially 
self-assessed health and chronic conditions) are negative because morbidity is more 
concentrated among the lower income groups and increases the likelihood of using 
specialist services.  
 
More interesting are the contributions of the non-need determinants, i.e. the factors 
affecting the difference between the actual distribution and the one expected on the basis 
of need indicators alone. It can be seen that the contribution of the (partial) effect of 
income itself is much smaller than that of, for instance, not having paid employment. 
Because private insurance is associated both with higher income and higher use of 
specialist visits, it has a strong positive contribution to the observed pro-rich distribution. 
Interestingly, for the opposite reasons, i.e. lower income associated with lower use, 
ceteris paribus, the concession card also contributes positively to specialist use inequality. 
These findings should be interpreted with caution. Obviously, private insurance and 
concession card status may be endogenous and it is likely that selection into these states 








The results of the decomposition exercise for all types of care are presented graphically in 
Figure 4, which shows the contributions to the measured degree of inequity after 
subtracting the need contributions following equation (8)). The most influential factors 
are the insurance and employment status variables. Concession cards contribute 
substantially to the observed pro-poor distribution of the GP and all doctor visit 
probability. In all cases, private insurance shows a positive contribution to income-related 
inequity, but only for the probability of a specialist visit or a hospital admission, this 
contribution is substantial. Less obvious is the role played by employment status, which 
reduces inequity in specialist use and makes hospital admission pro-poor.  To some 
extent, this may be because, all else equal, not being in paid employment may be an 
indicator of need for care. If, for instance, most of the contribution is due to disability 
status, then in fact the contribution may be largely need-driven. If this were true, and 
employment status could be seen as a proxy for care need, then inclusion of its 
contribution among the need factors - and its deduction from overall inequity, would 
make specialist even more pro-rich and would turn hospital admissions from pro-poor 
into pro-rich inequity. 
 
 




Overall, based on our analysis of the NHS  2001 data, we can conclude that Medicare 
largely does appear to be attaining its goal of an equitable distribution of health care 
access: Australians in need for care do get to see a doctor and to be admitted to a hospital. 
However, they are not equally likely to see the same doctor and to end up in the same 
hospital bed. As in other OECD countries, while lower income Australians are more 
likely to consult a general practitioner, those on higher incomes are more likely to go on 
to consult a specialist, all else equal. Those on higher incomes are also more likely to be 
admitted into hospital as a private than as a public patient. The unequal distribution of 
private insurance by income further stimulates the phenomenon that the better-off and the 
less well-off do not receive the same mix of services. While the partial effect of private 
insurance identified in this paper cannot be interpreted as causal because it is at least 
partially endogenous, European evidence suggests that controlling for endogeneity does 
not necessarily reduce the specialist utilisation effect of (supplementary) private 
insurance. Indeed, using employer-provided cover as an instrument, Jones et al (2006) 
find that there is positive (rather than adverse) selection into such coverage and that 
correction for this selection effect even increases the utilisation effect. So the estimated 
contribution of private insurance need not necessarily be an upper bound.   
 
Similarly, the chances of being admitted as a public or private patient are very unequally 
distributed and very much related to the unequal distribution of private insurance and 
medical cards by income. Whether or not the observed unequal care mix by income is 
  
undesirable probably depends on the extent to which it translates into unequal health 
outcomes. Evidence from other countries suggests that unequal access to specialist care 
services may result in unequal outcomes for cardiac patients (e.g. Alter et al 2004, 2006 
for Ontario), but such evidence is currently lacking for Australia.   
 
Our study was somewhat constrained by the limitations of the NHS 2001 survey data. As 
is true for all surveys, all information - on both income, health and use - is self-reported 
and therefore may to some degree be subject to inaccurate recall, or misreporting. In 
addition, and because of the typical infrequency of health care utilisation, the very short 
recall period of two weeks makes it less than ideal for a more detailed analysis of its 
appropriateness. And finally, it is unclear to what extent the hospital admission data used 
here excludes some same-day admissions, which is not unimportant because they 
constitute around half of all hospital admissions in Australia. Most of these limitations 
could be overcome if administrative health care data such Medicare records could be 
linked with measures of socioeconomic status such as income from taxation records. This 
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Table 1: Fractions of users, by quintile, by type of care, (NHS 2001) 
 
 Quintile      
  1 2 3  4  5  Total  Conc/HI 
Index 
t-stat 
Probability of a visit to:              
Actual use               
Any doctor, in 12months  0.895 0.880 0.833  0.830 0.832  0.854 -0.0164  -6.97 
a GP, in 2 weeks  0.339 0.304 0.216  0.193 0.179  0.245 -0.1411  -14.45 
a specialist, in 2 weeks  0.079 0.068 0.057  0.055 0.065  0.065 -0.0505  -2.37 
Any doctor, in  2 weeks  0.373 0.335 0.242  0.222 0.217  0.277 -0.1233  -13.7 
Need standardized use               
Any doctor, in 12months  0.852 0.850 0.847  0.853  0.864 0.854  0.0029  1.29 
a GP, in 2 weeks  0.281 0.268 0.235  0.224 0.220  0.245 -0.0535  -5.73 
a specialist, 2 weeks  0.057 0.059 0.063  0.065 0.078  0.065  0.0634  3.03 
Any doctor, in 2 weeks  0.309 0.297 0.262  0.255 0.260  0.276 -0.0394  -4.6 
Admission probability to:              
Actual use               
Any Hospital, in 12 months  0.176 0.173 0.136  0.109 0.108  0.139 -0.1205  -8.73 
Public Admit., in  12 months  0.130 0.115 0.070  0.046 0.038  0.079 -0.2632  -13.82 
Priv Admit., in 12 months  0.046  0.058  0.066  0.063  0.070  0.061  0.0650  3.04 
Need standardized use              
Any Hospital, 12 months  0.145 0.156 0.140  0.122 0.135  0.139 -0.0329  -2.47 
           
Note:  A positive/negative CI indicates a pro-rich/pro-poor distribution. Index in bold typeface indicates 




Table 2: Decomposition analysis of income-related inequality in specialist visit 
probability 
 













(At least one) specialist visit (actual)  0.065 -0.050      -0.050  
(At least one) specialist visit (pred)  0.065 -0.114      -0.056 
Horizontal Inequity Index            0.0633 
           
Log (hh income)  6.054 0.067  0.002  0.51  0.014  0.014 
Self-assessed health very good  0.325 0.110  0.005  0.98  0.003     
Self-assessed health good  0.309 -0.034  0.015  2.5  -0.002     
Self-assessed health fair  0.139 -0.217  0.050  5.17  -0.023     
Self-assessed health poor  0.050 -0.427  0.095  5.02  -0.031  -0.054 
Health worse than a year ago  0.113 -0.110  0.046  4.65  -0.009     
Health much worse than a year ago  0.020 -0.236  0.138  4.51  -0.010  -0.019 
Male 34-49  0.160 0.181  -0.005 -0.76  -0.002     
Male 50-64  0.115 0.070  -0.005 -0.53  -0.001     
Male 65-74  0.049 -0.384  0.015  0.94  -0.004     
Male 75+  0.032 -0.414  0.009  0.46  -0.002  -0.009 
Female15-34  0.146 0.074  0.045  3.79  0.008     
Female 34-49  0.159 0.066  0.011  1.33  0.002     
Female 50-64  0.108 -0.047  0.016  1.4  -0.001     
Female 65-74  0.050 -0.425  0.009  0.54  -0.003     
Female 75+  0.041 -0.487  -0.028  -1.65  0.009     
Fem 20-35 with child(ren)  0.090 -0.076  -0.011  -0.8  0.001  0.015 
Other Infectious Diseases  0.010 -0.054  0.057  1.87  -0.001   
Other Neoplasms  0.003 -0.009  -0.014  -0.35  0.000   
Diabetes with no Complications  0.035 -0.276  0.040  2.2  -0.006   
Type I Diabetes Mellitus  0.006 -0.215  0.086  1.85  -0.002   
Other endocrine Disorders  0.087 -0.158  -0.004  -0.37  0.001   
Peptic Ulcer, Hemorrhage, Other 
Specified Gastrointestinal Disorders  0.036 -0.211  -0.005  -0.32  0.001   
Other Gastrointestinal Disorders  0.074 -0.097  -0.005  -0.5  0.001   
Rheumatoid Arthritis   0.032 -0.299  0.024  1.38  -0.004   
Osteoporosis   0.030 -0.236  0.046  2.37  -0.005   
Other Musculoskeletal Disorders  0.404 -0.082  0.004  0.71  -0.002   
Disorders of Immunity  0.003 0.030  0.106  1.41  0.000   
Iron Deficiency and Anemias   0.016 -0.069  0.005  0.27  0.000   
Drug/Alcohol Abuse  0.008 -0.122  -0.004  -0.14  0.000   
Personality Disorders  0.048 -0.169  0.028  1.88  -0.003   
Depression  0.007 -0.227  -0.035  -1.16  0.001   
Anxiety Disorders  0.051 -0.121  0.001  0.08  0.000   
Other Psychiatric Disorders  0.034 -0.261  0.029  1.65  -0.004   
Other Developmental Disability  0.001 -0.049  -0.040  -0.97  0.000   
Seizure Disorders and Convulsions  0.007 -0.216  0.060  1.43  -0.001   
Mononeuropathy/Injuries  0.076 0.007  0.005  0.53  0.000   
Hypertensive Heart Disease  0.142 -0.227  0.006  0.66  -0.003   
Other  Heart Disease  0.001 -0.218  -0.097  -3.44  0.000   
Cerebrovascular Disease  0.028 -0.407  0.009  0.5  -0.002   
Vascular Disease  0.015 -0.373  -0.011  -0.51  0.001   
Other Circulatory Disease  0.040 -0.162  -0.003  -0.19  0.000   
  
Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Dis.  0.010 -0.417  -0.047  -1.84  0.003   
Asthma  0.106 -0.026  0.001  0.11  0.000   
Other Lung Disorders  0.032 -0.185  -0.002  -0.11  0.000   
Glaucoma  0.013 -0.257  0.048  1.65  -0.002   
Cataract  0.029 -0.362  0.038  1.86  -0.006   
Other Eye Disorders  0.654 -0.031  0.010  1.69  -0.003   
Hearing Loss  0.141 -0.141  0.013  1.73  -0.004   
Other Ear, Nose, Throat Disorders  0.281 0.033  -0.003 -0.59  0.000   
Urinary Obstruction and Retention  0.026 -0.144  0.003  0.15  0.000   
Incontinence  0.012 -0.320  0.025  0.88  -0.001   
Other Urinary Tract Disorders  0.019 -0.019  0.017  0.87  0.000   
Other Dermatological Disorders  0.034 0.006  -0.015 -1.27  0.000   
Major Symptoms, Abnormalities  0.004 -0.237  0.122  1.87  -0.002   
Minor Symptoms, Signs, Findings  0.103 -0.072  0.020  2.22  -0.002  -0.047 
Education: year 9 to 11 completed  0.385  -0.012  0.004  0.58  0.000    
Education: Year 12 or more  completed  0.380  0.220  0.009  1.25  0.012  0.012 
Self-employed  0.100 0.066  0.007  0.99  0.001     
Unemployed  0.034 -0.613  -0.019  -1.9  0.006     
Out of labor force  0.344 -0.401  0.019  2.35  -0.041  -0.034 
Main language spoken not English  0.150 -0.139  -0.017  -2.46  0.005  0.005 
Resident of major city  0.667 0.048  0.025  4.18  0.012     
Resident of inner region   0.213 -0.098  0.017  2.47  -0.006  0.007 
Private  insurance  0.516 0.207  0.024  4.54  0.039  0.039 






Figure 1:  Concentration index of medical care use 







02 04 06 08 0




































Figure 2: GP and specialist visit probabilities in the last two weeks by doctor type by 














Figure 3: Public and private admission probabilities in the last 12 months by quintile of 











Figure. 4: Decomposition of inequity into determinant contributions  
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